The transition to market-oriented economies in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the 1990s, like the Great Depression in the U.S. and Germany in the 1930s, generated sharp declines in real incomes and a corresponding drop in fertility. This is contrary to the robust negative relationship between income and fertility that has been extensively documented. This paper presents a theoretical model that explains the positive relationship between fertility and income. The model predicts that: i) the perceived level of subsistence consumption fundamentally determines whether fertility and income are positively or negatively related; ii) once incomes decline below a threshold, declining labor income causes fertility to fall; and iii) rising income inequality has a negative impact on fertility rates. Empirical tests using both aggregate and microeconomic data provide strong support for the predictions of the model. Our empirics predict that the perceived subsistence level is a statistically significant determinant of fertility and that the average country in our sample will remain in a Mathusian fertility regime for twenty more years.
INTRODUCTION
The link between birth rates and economic conditions has intrigued economists since the beginning of systematic economic analysis. Malthus contended that fertility would rise as incomes increase and vice versa, influencing the predictions of nineteenthcentury economists. Counter to Malthus' prediction, during the past 150 years fertility generally fell rather than rose as incomes grew. Empirical evidence on the inverse relationship between fertility and income per capita has been extensively documented in the literature (e.g., Tamura, 1988; Barro, 1991; Feng, Kugler & Zak, 2000) . Much of the recent literature on fertility and economic growth has modeled the transition from the "Malthusian" stage where there is a positive relationship between income and population growth, to the "modern" stage characterized by an inverse relationship between income and fertility (e.g., Becker et al., 1990; Kremer, 1993; Galor & Weil, 1996; Dahan & Tsiddon, 1998) .
In the wake of the collapse of the communist block, Malthusian fertility has reemerged in Eastern and Central Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union. Indeed, the transition by communist countries to market-oriented economies in the 1990s, like the Great Depression in the U.S. and Germany in the 1930s, generated sharp declines in real incomes and corresponding drops in fertility rates. This paper reconciles the existing models of fertility with the positive relationship between income and fertility observed in the former communist countries. It does this by analyzing the impact of individuals' perceived subsistence level of consumption on economic and fertility choices. In addition to an explanation for the dramatic fall in fertility following the transition, this paper sheds new light on the mechanisms linking income inequality and fertility.
Some scholars have suggested that the fall in fertility in transition countries is unrelated to the economic factors. According to these views, all or most of the recent decrease in fertility is the result of a shift toward Western-style reproductive behaviors (Conrad, et al., 1996) , attitudes toward family and work (Maxwell, 1998) , or the removal of pronatalist politics of the 1980s (Zakharov & Ivanova, 1996) . However, these explanations have little support in the data, as shown by the more rapid than average decline in fertility rates among older women especially in the former Soviet Union, by the frequent increases in the share of first births in total births, and by the results of recent surveys on factors influencing women's childbearing decisions. For instance, in a 1999 survey in Russia, 97 percent of the women interviewed cited a lack of money as a major barrier to having another child, 15 percent said inadequate housing was the main cause, while 8 percent cited the confidence in regaining their jobs after childbirth (The New York Times, 2000) . 1 This paper presents an equilibrium model in which individuals consume, save and make fertility choices, in the tradition of Becker (1960) , Razin & Ben-Zion (1975) , and Becker & Barro (1988) . To derive nonergodic behavior from an otherwise standard intertemporal fertility model, a subsistence level of consumption is introduced. The model is thus related to the work by Azariadis (1996) and Jones (2000) . This paper, however, extends these studies in three primary ways. First, we derive rather than assume a structural break that produces a demographic transition, i.e., a threshold below which 1 For additional surveys with similar findings, see Haub (1994) . fertility declines as incomes fall. Second, we characterize the relationship between fertility and the distribution of income taking into account subsistence consumption. We show that this produces a nonmonotone relationship between inequality and fertility.
And third, we subject the model's implications to a battery of empirical tests which we show support the model's predictions. Indeed, the model has three primary testable predictions: i) the perceived level of subsistence consumption fundamentally determines whether fertility and income are positively or negatively related; ii) once incomes decline below an identified threshold, declining labor income causes fertility to fall; and iii) rising income inequality has a negative impact on fertility rates. These results are quite intuitive. (Milanovic & Jovanovic, 1999) .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the remarkable decline in birth rates and real incomes in the former communist countries during the period of transition. In Section 3, we present an overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility. Section 4 derives implications from the model, while Section 5 empirically tests the implications of the model. Section 6 concludes by reviewing our primary findings.
2 THE POST-COMMUNIST "GREAT DEPRESSION" AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC
RESPONSE
Although experiences varied from country to country, the transition from communism generally featured a sharp fall in real incomes, associated in many countries with a rise in unemployment and inflation. In a number of countries these developments caused widespread poverty and disintegration of the comprehensive social programs developed by the former regimes. It is therefore not surprising that the transition has profoundly affected, in many different ways, the lives and behavior of the hundreds of millions of people. One of the ways people reacted to the palpable worsening of material circumstances was reflected in a precipitous drop in fertility rates. percent decline). The dispersion of fertility rates among transition economies also declined, indicating decreased differences among countries.
The contrast with European Union (EU) countries, where the crude birth rate fell by 10 percent during the same period, puts the fertility decline within a broader European context. As Table 1 shows, the fertility decline in the transition countries was three to four times as large as the decline recorded in the EU countries during the same period. A fortiori, the largest reductions in fertility rates among EU countries recorded in the 1970s and 1980s is unmatched by the deep fertility declines for the transition countries during the 1990s. 4 Before the fall of communism, average fertility in every regional grouping of countries in Table 1 Out of the four countries, Russia experienced the most severe fertility reduction, mirroring the decline in its GDP. In 1997 the fertility rate in Russia was 41 percent below its base level. While the data may be subject to measurement error, the figures clearly illustrate that massive income declines produce a different effect on fertility than do gradual income variations. Unfavorable shocks seemingly jar an economy into a Malthusian state where fertility declines follow drops in income. The key assumption in the model developed in the next section is that there is a switch in domination between the substitution and income effects of a change in income on fertility depending on the level of income. Specifically, the substitution effect (child-rearing requires time away from work) normally dominates the income effect (children are more affordable) à la Becker (1991). However, if income falls sufficiently relative to the subsistence level of consumption, the income effect dominates the substitution effect and the willingness to have children falls. This is shown in the indifference map in Figure 3 where households become less willing to trade consumption for children as they become poorer within a critical range. 5 In particular, when income is sufficiently low relative to the subsistence level of consumption, a household with utility level U is less willing to give up consumption in order to increase births from b 1 to b 2 than is the wealthier household at utility U''. 
Note: b is births, c is consumption.
Both the Great Depression and the transition of the former communist countries featured an increased proportion of those living in poverty, including those that were traditionally situated in the middle class. For example, Milanovic & Jovanovic (1999) show that in Russia between 1993-96 the percentage of the population who (subjectively) considered themselves poor was extremely high, 60-90 percent, and varied over time.
Even according to the "objective" criterion of the official poverty line, the proportion of the poor increased from 25-60 percent during the same period. Because of the impoverishment of the middle class, income inequality rose sharply post transition.
6 Therefore, the analysis that follows characterizes the effects of changes in both the level and distribution of income on fertility.
THE MODEL
Agents in this model live three periods in overlapping generations, and are heterogeneous in their human capital and in the perceived level of subsistence consumption. The first period of an agent's life is childhood, the second is young adulthood, and the third is old age. By assumption, parents choose their children's consumption, and therefore children do not receive utility from consuming goods. In the second period of life, agents supply labor inelastically to firms, choose family size, and save for old age. Reproduction is limited to the second period of life and, for simplicity, children are produced by parthenogenesis (asexual reproduction). 7 We also abstract from the spacing of children by assuming that parents have all of their children at the beginning of adulthood. In old age, agents are retired and consume from the principal and interest on their savings. Agents die at the end of the third period of their lives. When utility is logarithmic, the lifetime utility maximization problem for agent i born at time t -1 is 7 Parthenogenesis simplifies the intergenerational transmissions of human capital and allows us to avoid the issue of marriage matching; on marriage matching, see Zak & Park (in press ) and Burdett & Coles (1997) . 8 Note that the model does not assume that parents are altruistic toward their children. The incorporation of altruism would complicate but not substantially change the analysis (see Zak, 2000) . 
THE CONSUMER'S PROBLEM
where β ∈ (0,1) is the patience parameter, γ > 0 is the weight on the preference for children, and ( )
1 , + are the perceived subsistence consumption levels for young and old adults. The budget constraints in (1) relate to the two periods of adulthood.
9 Lastly, b > 0 is the minimum number of children in each family.
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The rearing of children is a time intensive activity (Birdsall, 1988) . Rather than include a "time spent with children" choice for parents, we simplify the model by assuming that higher wages induce a substitution effect away from fertility by raising the cost of children nonlinearly, though with an upper bound. As a result, the cost of children is parameterized as a convex function of labor income, 9 Perceived levels of subsistence consumption are primarily affected by an individual's past consumption and by comparison with the consumption of others. The factors that influence the formation of perceived subsistence levels are outside the scope of this paper. For a discussion of comparison utility in an endogenous growth model, see Carroll, Overland & Weil (1997) . 10 The constraint that 0
is necessary for well-defined asymptotic behavior of the system but is not crucial to the analysis.
. The parameter ρ > 1 is the constant elasticity of the cost of children with respect to the labor income. Optimal savings, (3), is increasing in income, decreasing in the preference for children parameter, γ, and increasing in the patience parameter, β. As expected, optimal savings is negatively related to current perceived subsistence consumption, . The optimal number of children (4), which will be the focus of the analysis in the following sections, increases as the preference for children rises and falls as the perceived subsistence consumption levels increase. 
This lemma demonstrates that if labor income declines sufficiently relative to the current and discounted future subsistence levels of consumption, children become less affordable and fertility decreases. To wit, when income drops sufficiently, the income effect on fertility dominates the substitution effect, reducing the birth rates.
Note that since ρ > 1, the Malthusian threshold Figure 4 .
16 13 Note that ρ is constant from individual's point of view, but it could vary across countries. 14 For extensive discussion of family social services during both the former regimes and the transition period, see Milanovic (1998) . wh , rising inequality negatively impacts fertility. To derive this result, we use the notion of a mean preserving spread (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1970) in which one distribution is constructed from another by moving mass from the middle of the distribution to the tails, keeping the mean constant and increasing the variance. 17 Let µ be an appropriately defined measure defined over young adult agents. Then we have The intuition for this result is straightforward: during an economic depression, the proportion of agents with income below the Malthusian threshold increases and children become less affordable. As long as there are not too many high income agents (i.e. nonMalthusians), rising inequality produces a larger proportion of poor individuals who behave as Malthus predicted. Note that this theorem does not depend on the minimum number of births being b , but follows from the aggregation of fertilty choices with varying domination of income and substitution effects.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The model produces three empirically testable predictions for fertility in times of economic depression. First, declining labor income causes fertility to fall. Second, since the condition in Theorem 1 is likely to be satisfied for all post-transition countries, increases in income inequality also have contributed to fertility declines. Third, higher perceived levels of subsistence consumption have a negative impact on fertility rates.
The first two predictions are tested using cross-section time-series data for 23 transition countries from 1979 to 1999. 19 The third prediction is directly tested using microeconomic data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS).
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19 This is the largest number of transition countries for which we have been able to assemble data on variables in the model. Out of 27 transition countries, four countries (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Yugoslavia) were excluded from our empirical analyses because of missing or unreliable data. 20 The RLMS is supervised by the Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The first phase started in 1992 with around 6,300 households. The second phase started in 1994 with Individual-level data avoids the endogeneity issues that plague the fertility-income association in aggregate data. Most importantly, this dataset allows us to directly test the impact of perceived levels of subsistence consumption on fertility choices.
FERTILITY IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES: CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE
We use both common measures of fertility in our studies, the crude birth rate (CBR) and the total fertility rate (TFR), as a robustness check. Wages -a factor that determines labor income -are proxied by real GDP per capita since, by equation (A3), they are directly proportional to each other. As in Barro (1991) , school enrollment rates are used as proxies for human capital, the other factor that determines labor income in the model. In particular, we use gross secondary school enrollment rates measuring the number of students enrolled in the designated grade levels relative to the total population of the corresponding age group. Except in three transition countries (Hungary, Poland and Slovenia), secondary school enrollment plummeted after 1990, with the largest decline (more than 50 percent) recorded in Albania. The birth rate, real GDP per capita, and secondary school enrollment data are all taken from the World Bank (World
Development Indicators, 2001).
Income inequality is typically measured by the Gini coefficients in the Deininger-Squire dataset. However, this dataset does not contain full time-series data for most transition countries. A major improvement in measuring income inequality in the countries under study is the UNICEF/ICDC TransMONEE project on monitoring social almost 4,000 households. The data has been collected a total of 9 times. For a detailed description of the RLMS dataset, see http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms/rlms_home.html.
conditions and public policy in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union. 21 The measure of income inequality used in our analysis is taken from the TransMONEE data on Gini coefficients of monthly earnings that span from 1989 to 1997 for 15 transition countries.
Finally, the transition from communism to market economies was accompanied, in most countries, by a dramatic increase in democratization and political liberalization.
To control for this effect, we include a measure of civil liberties from the Polity IV dataset. Notes: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for country dummies are not shown to conserve space. * = significant at 10 percent; ** = significant at 5 percent; *** = significant at 1 percent. 1) Data span from 1989-97 for 15 countries. Table 2 reports the results of using the FGLS procedure with country fixed effects (Greene, 2000) . 23 All independent variables are lagged one period to instrument the variables the theory identifies as jointly endogenous with births, as well as to capture dynamic changes in the underlying structure. To account for the nonlinear relationship between births and labor income shown in Figure 4 , squares of the proxies for wages and human capital are included in the regressions.
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Regressions (1) and (3) The F-test for the presence of fixed effects rejected the null hypothesis that the intercept parameters for all countries are equal. 24 The relationship between fertility and income when income is less than i wh can be approximated by a quadratic function. This is the domain relevant for our analysis. 25 The maximal TFR at the threshold is 1.90.
predicts that the average country in our sample will remain in a Malthusian fertility regime for the next twenty years. Regressions (2) and (4) add the GINI variable measuring income inequality to the base equations. As predicted by Theorem 1, increasing inequality has a negative and significant impact on fertility. However, once the effects of income inequality have been controlled for, the coefficients on secondary school enrollment are no longer significant.
This suggests that inequality and school enrollment may have the same source of variation. Nevertheless, the coefficient estimates on GDP per capita are consistently statistically significant and robustly impact fertility in each regression.
Throughout regressions (1) to (4) Taken as a whole, the empirical results support the first two predictions of the theory (a Malthusian threshold and the role of inequality). Next, we turn to testing the third prediction, the direct role of perceived subsistence levels on fertility choices.
FERTILITY AND HARDSHIP: MICROECONOMIC EVIDENCE FROM RUSSIA
In this section we use the 1998/99 RLMS data as the basis for our empirical work rather than aggregated national data. This data set, which includes complete survey responses from approximately 8,700 individuals (of which almost 5,000 are women), provides information that can be used to estimate the effect of the perceived subsistence level on fertility choices directly.
The dependent variable, fertility, is based on a question in the RLMS on willingness to have a (another) child for women between 18 and 50 years of age who appeared to be fertile and have less than two children. 26 The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a woman wants to have (another) child and 0 otherwise. We develop a standard probit regression model in which fertility is a function of income and the perceived poverty minimum as a proxy for perceived subsistence consumption. 27 To account for economies of size within the household, both income and the perceived poverty level are calculated per equivalent adult using a single-parameter equivalence of 0.5. 28 In addition, we augment equation (4) fertility has a quadratic relationship with income, initially increasing, and then decreasing. Also, as expected, the higher the perceived poverty line the less likely that a woman will want to have a (another) child. Indeed, the estimated coefficient on the perceived poverty level is not only statistically significant, but quantitatively important, being about 50% larger (in absolute value) than the estimated coefficient on income itself.
Regression (2) In regression (3), we include several demographic variables that may influence fertility choices. The relationship between fertility and age of the woman is quadratic, with the willingness to have children increasing until age 23 (the average age of women at childbearing in 1998), and then decreasing. When age is included in the regression, however, the effect of the perceived poverty level is considerably reduced and only marginally significant. The theory additionally predicts that increases in income inequality and perceived subsistence consumption levels decrease the aggregate number of births. For a sample of 23 transition countries, we find strong empirical support for these propositions.
Is taking into account perceived subsistence consumption an appealing explanation for drastic declines in fertility in times of economic disruption? It might be possible to explain this behavior in transition countries through some different factor or factors, without considering the effects of income or perceived subsistence consumption.
Nevertheless, because the model provides such a good explanation of the data, it is unclear why one would want to abandon the explanatory power of per capita income and perceived subsistence for an alternative explanation.
APPENDIX
This appendix defines a competitive equilibrium for the model, provides proofs, and presents description of variables used in the empirical analysis.
A.1 FIRMS AND EQUILIBRIUM
We close the model by specifying the problem faced by firms and then defining a competitive equilibrium. In every period the economy produces a single homogenous good, using physical capital and efficiency units of labor in the production process.
Assume that there are many firms operating in a competitive environment and that agents of all human capital types are necessary to produce output. Let K t be the aggregate physical capital, µ be an appropriately defined measure over working agents,
µ is the mass of working agents, and
µ is aggregate human capital, i.e., the quantity of efficiency units of labor employed in production at time t.
The profit maximization problem for a representative firm at time t is
where r t is the cost of financing capital investments and t w is the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor at time t. Let the production function be Cobb-Douglas
for α ∈ (0, 1). Solving for the firm's profit maximizing condition using (A1) and (A2),
shows that the labor income paid to a type i agent is the marginal product of type i labor, ( ) Future expectations (1 = will live much worse, … 5 = will live much better) / "Do you 2.51 think that in the next 12 months you and your family will live (1.07) better than today?" Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. The sample includes responses from women between 18 and 50 years of age who appeared to be fertile and had less than two children. Source: The 1998/99 round of the RLMS dataset
